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Introducing Inventiveness into the Patent System 
Submission to the 
Review of the National Innovation System 
 
1. Innovation Diffusion and Economic Growth 
The Department’s call for submissions rightly draws attention to the need to consider both 
the generation and the diffusion of innovation. Given the small proportion of firms (and 
other organisations and individuals) generating genuinely new knowledge and ideas, it is 
inevitable that diffusion is the key driver of productivity growth.1 This is based on simple 
arithmetic – where the bulk of the economy is involved with the adoption of innovations 
that are new to the firm or the industry, rather than to the country or the world, productivity 
improvements are driven principally by technology diffusion.  
Despite the central importance of innovation diffusion to productivity growth and therefore 
to economic growth, the principal attention in national innovation policy is directed to the 
generation of new knowledge and ideas and their initial industrial application. The major 
Commonwealth Government initiatives to support innovation involve funding to public 
research bodies, encouragement of effective co-operation between research bodies and 
firms, and funding for corporate research and development activities. In addition, the 
government intervenes massively in the innovation market by providing legislated 
monopolies (patents) for “inventions”. Commonwealth Government programs and policies 
to encourage the diffusion of technology are sparse.  
To some extent this is because such programs fall more clearly within the ambit of State 
Government responsibility. Diffusion programs are often located under the heading “small 
business” rather than under “innovation”. The Commonwealth Government has had 
specific programs to encourage diffusion – such as the National Teaching Company 
Scheme – but these are generally small compared to the resources devoted to innovation 
generation. 
                                                 
1
  As National Innovation Surveys show, only a small proportion of innovating firms are generating 
innovations which are new to the world or to the country. See, for example, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2005. 
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The major Commonwealth Government policy affecting technology diffusion is in fact the 
patent system. While designed ostensibly to encourage the generation of inventions, the 
mechanism by which this is achieved is the suppression of technology diffusion. The patent 
monopoly is the grant of a right to exclude others from using a specified area of technology 
or knowledge application, whether independently developed or not.  
2. Submission Outline 
This submission raises some serious questions about the role of the patent system as it 
operates today. Because of the potential impact of the patent system on innovation 
diffusion, particularly on continuous and/or incremental innovation, this issue should be of 
central importance to the review of the national innovation system.  
The submission draws heavily on my near-complete PhD thesis (Moir, forthcoming), but 
provides a far more condensed argument.2 On the basis of empirical evidence about the 
inducement effect of the patent system, and the current very low inventiveness standard for 
patent grant, policy proposals are put forward to re-introduce inventiveness into the patent 
system, thus making it potentially welfare-enhancing. These proposed changes would also 
have a major impact in ameliorating the negative impact of the patent system on 
continuous/incremental innovation.  
What is the role of patents in ensuring a return to investment in research and development 
(R&D)? Section 3 draws attention to the substantial empirical evidence that only in 
exceptional cases do patents induce innovation. Only where technologies are highly 
codified is there likely to be any failure in the innovation generation market.3 In the general 
case, companies are well able to obtain a return on their R&D investment through market 
mechanisms, particularly first-mover advantages and complementary assets and capacities. 
On the basis of this evidence, most industrial innovations are not induced by the patent 
system. Even in very large markets, such as the USA, only a minority of patents are likely 
to be induced by the patent system. 
To the extent that patents do induce innovations, it is the inventiveness of the innovation 
which gives rise to possible social benefits (externalities, mainly in the form of knowledge 
                                                 
2
  The full draft document can be obtained from the author on request.  
3
  There is also a strong a priori (theoretical) argument that where initial investments are large or lumpy, 
there may be a failure in the innovation generation market. This possibility was identified by Arrow (1962) 
and has been analysed more recently by Boldrin and Levine (2004).  
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spillovers) which may offset the costs of a patent system and thus give rise to a net 
economic benefit. Attention is thus turned to the balance in the patent system. This brief 
review focuses on changes in patent law, particularly with respect to the subject matter that 
can be patented, and to standards of inventiveness (Section 4). It provides a very condensed 
description of the changes to the patent system that have given rise to a situation where 
“anything under the sun invented by man” is patentable, with a deep gulf between the 
patent meaning of “obvious” and that in common use.  
Section 5 briefly reviews the results of my empirical investigation of the inventiveness of 
recently granted Australian business method patents. Among these 72 patents there are no 
contributions to new knowledge or its application. As TRIPS, to which Australia is a 
signatory, requires no discrimination in patent law between technologies, there is a strong 
likelihood that in other technology fields Australia is readily granting patents for 
completely uninventive inventions. The analysis of these 72 cases raises a number of issues 
about administrative and doctrinal rules currently used in the granting of patents.  
These three sets of data provide essential background and evidence for the main part of this 
submission (Section 6). This is a set of TRIPS-compliant proposals to re-introduce 
inventiveness into the patent system. They would have the effect of potentially re-focussing 
innovation resources on substantial innovations. At the same time they would reduce if not 
eliminate the impediments to an environment of continuous adoption and improvement of 
new technologies and methods of doing businesses. Businesses could focus on profit and 
growth rather than on avoiding legal complications due to monopoly grants to their 
competitors.  
3. Do Patents Induce Innovation? 
Given that patent policy is a prime example of regulatory intervention into the operation of 
the market, there should ideally be a substantial body of evidence that the intervention is 
welfare-enhancing. Despite suggestions from review bodies, such as IPAC (1984), there 
continues to be an almost total absence of evidence about the operation of the patent 
system.  
4 
It is generally taken for granted that patent laws are needed if a country is to have a high 
level of invention.4 This conventional view has not been interrogated, despite the body of 
empirical work on industrial innovation whose results call it into question. Based on the 
evidence of increasingly large-scale surveys, repeated in many countries, and covering 
firms of all sizes and in all industry sectors, in most circumstances patents are the least 
effective of a number of mechanisms for ensuring a return to investment in industrial R&D. 
The general finding is that for firms of all sizes, and in almost all industries, most 
investment in industrial innovation would occur in a world without patents. Patent policy is 
thus not having the intended effect. In most circumstances it does not induce additional 
innovation activity—it simply provides a potential windfall gain for activity that would 
occur anyway. As there are costs generated by a patent system, the clear conclusion is that, 
in most circumstances patent policy is welfare-reducing not welfare enhancing. Its position 
as the default innovation policy choice can only be seen as irrational. 
There are, however, some exceptions where patents are reported, by senior industry figures, 
to be essential as a mechanism to induce innovation investment. The principal circumstance 
is the narrow range of industries where the new knowledge embodied in innovations is 
highly codified (and thus relatively more easily copied), and where innovation investment 
costs are large and indivisible. The primary examples are the pharmaceutical and fine 
chemicals industries. Some commentators have argued that patent policy is precisely 
designed for the type of innovation system evident in these industries (Mandeville, 1996, 
Macdonald, 2004). For these few industries, patent policy may generate more benefits than 
costs, and so may be welfare-enhancing. 
The empirical data provide a sound evidence base for selecting between competing 
economic theories that have been used in discussions on patent policy, thus placing policy 
debate on a more rational basis.5 To date, much of the discussion on patent policy has been 
theoretical or opinion-based. Those in favour of strong patent systems draw on a narrow 
neo-classical framework to argue that, absent patents, the level of innovative activity would 
be socially sub-optimal. Those who are in favour of a weak patent system are more likely to 
draw on information economics to point out that the key role of knowledge is as an input 
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  This underlying assumption is clear in several recent reviews: IPCRC (2000), (US) Federal Trade 
Commission, 2003, (US) National Academy of Sciences, 2004, as well as in academic articles (e.g. Gans et 
al., 2004).  
5
  This large empirical literature is discussed in detail in Moir, forthcoming. 
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into the production function, and that the costs of acquiring knowledge are high. They 
conclude that there are adequate market mechanisms to ensure a return to innovation 
generation, except where such innovation has a high component of codified knowledge. As 
a consequence, patents are unnecessary in most circumstances. 
The empirical data that have been collected over the past thirty years provide a substantial 
evidence base for selecting between these competing theories. While the main evidence 
was initially from the USA, the findings have been replicated in a number of European 
studies, and re-confirmed through the findings of large National Innovation Surveys.  
The initial study was by a group of Harvard Business School students interested in the 
impact of anti-trust decisions on patenting. This early study found that few companies 
considered patenting important in obtaining a return from R&D (Scherer et al., 1959). 
Taylor and Silberston (1973), in a study of British manufacturing firms found similar 
results: generally senior business figures did not consider patents to be important in 
ensuring a return to R&D investment. There was however a major exception: 
pharmaceutical and fine chemical firms. The findings of these studies were replicated, with 
larger samples, in the USA through the Yale survey in the 1980s and the Carnegie-Mellon 
survey a decade later (Levin et al., 1987, Cohen et al., 2000). These large-scale studies are 
supported by the results of smaller more intensive studies such as those undertaken by 
Mansfield and colleagues in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Mansfield et al., 1981, 
Mansfield 1986). Small-scale studies in other countries have found similar results (e.g. 
Harabi, 1995). Some of these studies directly address the issue of copying costs, and find 
that the costs of copying are far more substantial than assumed in the neo-classical theory.  
Beyond these specific studies, data from National Innovation Surveys confirm that patents 
are generally seen as the least effective means of ensuring a return to innovation (see e.g. 
Eurostat, 2004, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2005). 
The data clearly demonstrate that except where innovation is highly codified, imitation 
costs are substantial and lead-time advantages and access to complementary assets operate 
to ensure a sufficient return to innovation. There is generally no failure in the innovation 
generation market.  
The information economics approach provides a much sounder basis for the development 
of a welfare-enhancing patent policy: its assumptions are consistent with the empirical 
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evidence across all industries. Its predictions are borne out by the facts. Where the codified 
element of knowledge is high, as in the pharmaceutical industry, copying will be relatively 
less expensive. But where the tacit component is high copying will be expensive, both in 
terms of time and resources, and the market provides adequate returns to innovation 
investment. 
The clear conclusion from this evidence is that a welfare-enhancing patent policy would not 
apply across-the-board, but would rather be used only where it was effective in inducing 
additional innovation investment. Unfortunately the TRIPS Treaty makes this first-best 
option impossible without incurring the high cost of being excluded from the international 
free trade community.  
Because of the absence of direct data on the operation of patent systems, the theoretical 
pro-patent literature has not only been sanguine about the level of alleged benefits of patent 
systems, but it has also tended to gloss over the costs. One major strand in this literature is 
the view that the static efficiency losses due to the operation of patent monopolies will be 
low because in most cases there will be substitute products or processes (Gans et al., 2004). 
This may well be true. It would be useful if there were data that could be brought to bear on 
the issue. But to the extent that it is true, it also suggests that patent policy is ineffective in 
inducing benefits. If a patentee has very little market power, then s/he cannot obtain the 
monopoly returns which are alleged to be the inducement mechanism. Either there are 
monopoly opportunities, acting as an inducement mechanism—in which case there are both 
benefits and costs. Or there are no monopoly opportunities, and so neither costs nor 
benefits, except for the direct transaction costs.  
The absence of direct data on the impact of patented inventions is problematic. 
Commentators have suggested that the costs of a patent system are high (Cole, 2001), and 
increasing as patent systems are strengthened (Jaffe, 2000). Many patent offices have 
expressed concerns about the direct costs to patentees, especially smaller companies (for 
example, EPO, 1995). Of more concern from a welfare perspective are the possible costs in 
terms of negative impacts on subsequent innovation. There is an unfortunate gap in 
evidence on this matter, except for anecdotal evidence.6 There is the opportunity to obtain 
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  And some important historical examples where technological development has been held up because 
of patents. The most often quoted are the steam engine (Sell and May, 2001), radio, and airplane stabilisation 
and steering (Merges and Nelson, 1990; Cohen, 2005). Cohen concludes that although the probability of such 
hold-ups might be small, the social cost if they occur can be very substantial.  
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such evidence through the large-scale innovation surveys which are now regularly carried 
out in many countries. These surveys provide an excellent opportunity to ask innovating 
firms about the impact of the patents owned by others on their own innovative investment. 
This would provide an evidence base for discussions of what is alleged to be one of the 
major costs of patent systems. 
The essence of effective policy is that it achieves the intended outcome, at minimum 
unwanted cost. But patent policy does not appear to be effective in achieving the intended 
outcome—an increase in innovative activity—except in very narrowly circumscribed 
circumstances. Moir (forthcoming) estimates that only some three per cent of patented 
inventions granted in Australia are induced by the patent system and have the potential to 
generate the positive spillover benefits that would offset any costs imposed by the patent 
system. Other countries where the proportion of patents domestically owned is small would 
be in a similar situation. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the USA, where some 25 to 
33 per cent of patented inventions may be induced and potentially generating positive 
externalities.7 Thus in a country where a high proportion of patents are domestically owned, 
and where many foreign owned patents are domestically worked, a substantial minority of 
patents may generate benefits. For patent policy to be welfare-enhancing these benefits 
need to be greater than the costs imposed by the patent system as a whole. 
A threshold question in assessing whether a patent policy is welfare enhancing or not is the 
level of inventiveness of the granted patents. It is the development of new products and 
processes which can potentially generate spillover benefits, both in the form of increased 
consumer surplus, and though knowledge spillovers. The more inventive the innovations, 
the greater such benefits are likely to be. If a patented invention is only very marginally 
different from previous artefacts, it is unlikely to generate much additional consumer 
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  Essentially these estimates look at the proportion of patent grants by the country of residence of 
owners and by whether the invention falls into the pharmaceutical/fine chemical area or not. For small 
countries, such as Australia, the grant of an Australian patent to owners resident in very large markets is 
unlikely to be critical in the R&D investment decision. Thus for grants of Australian patents to G7 residents, 
no incentive effect is allowed. However for patents granted to owners resident outside the G7 groups of 
countries an incentive effect is assumed: 100 per cent of pharmaceutical/fine chemical inventions are assumed 
to be induced by the Australian patent system, and between 25 and 40 per cent of other technologies. The 25 
to 40 per cent range is from Cohen et al., 2000, and is the estimated proportion of patents taken out for other 
than defensive reasons. For the USA, companies located in large overseas markets may still need protected 
access to the US market to gain a return on R&D investment. Canada is treated the same as the USA, with no 
diminution in the incentive effect of US patents, but for the other five G7 countries, estimated percentages of 
patents induced are halved – that is 50 percent of pharmaceuticals/fine chemicals are estimated as induced, 
and between 12.5 and 20 per cent of patents in other technology areas. For all smaller countries the incentive 
effect of a US patent is treated as if the owner were resident in the USA or Canada.  
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surplus. And if a patented invention does not contribute new knowledge, it cannot generate 
knowledge spillovers. The higher the threshold level of inventiveness required for a patent, 
the more likely there will be a high level of benefits attributable to a patent system. 
4. A Short Review of Changes in the Patent System 
There have been some remarkable changes in the patent system over the period since 1945, 
more particularly over the past three decades. These changes have seen a substantial 
broadening in the types of “inventions” that can be patented – firstly to life forms and 
software, and subsequently to methods of doing business. The end result is that nowadays 
there is no requirement for either a scientific or a technological basis for a patentable 
invention.8 Christie (2000) concludes that in Australia today anything is patentable, 
provided that it is drafted in the form of a “useful” application.  
As well as this broadening in patentable subject matter, there has been a significant 
reduction in the inventiveness requirement for obtaining a patent.9 There is a substantial 
academic literature on the problems of uninventive, obvious or trivial patents. Lunney 
(2001, 2004) provides a substantial analysis of how recent court decisions in the USA have 
radically reduced the inventiveness standard for the grant of patents. Jaffe and Lerner 
(2004) provide some entertaining examples of obvious patents, in the context of a more 
serious analysis of the increasing dysfunctionality of the US patent system. Ullman (2000) 
demonstrates the role of the legal doctrine of a “person skilled in the art” in defining 
obviousness/inventiveness, while Bagley (2001) ably demonstrates that the narrowing in 
the definition of any particular field of technology (“art”) has contributed substantially to 
the lowering of the inventiveness standard. This literature is based on the US patent system, 
and there seems to be widespread agreement that the US patent system has a very low 
standard for assessing obviousness (inventiveness). Dreyfuss (2000) comments on the large 
number of “shockingly mundane” patents that are being issued in the business method field.  
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  At least in Australia, the USA and New Zealand. The European Patent Convention still seems to 
require a basis in technology. A fuller discussion of how these changes came about can be found in Moir 
(forthcoming): chapter 3.  
9
  Lawyers consider that novelty and inventiveness are two separate tests for patentability, but from a 
policy perspective it is more useful to consider inventiveness as a continuum, with lack of inventiveness (not 
new) at one end of the scale, and radical inventiveness (new paradigms) at the other. There are also other 
requirements for patentability. Some are formalities. Utility is generally defined as a substantive rather than a 
formal requirement, but from a non-legal perspective this requirement has become so broad that it is unlikely 
that anything that can earn a dollar would be defined as lacking in utility.  
9 
In the one published empirical article which assesses the content of granted patents for 
inventiveness,10 Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez (2005) use the (admittedly low) standards 
of the US Patent and Trade Mark Office (USPTO) to assess the 50 “best” granted software 
patents.11 They find that all involve only incremental innovations, and that two are obvious.  
These changes in patent policy have generally occurred through a series of judicial 
decisions, subsequently adopted into statutory law or regulations with no substantive policy 
debate.  
What has happened to the balance in patent law? 
The discussion of patent policy is dominated by lawyers, notwithstanding its clearly 
economic policy goals. Patent law has developed from a simple social contract—more 
innovation in exchange for temporary monopolies—into a complex and arcane set of rules, 
described in language closely related to that used in the 1624 Statute of Monopolies. The 
rule-complexity and archaic language have been used effectively to limit discussion of 
patent policy, not just to lawyers, but to members of the patent community (patent 
attorneys, patent office staff, and major users of the patent system, often represented by 
their in-house patent attorneys).  
Patent law has changed considerably since the English parliament first codified Common 
Law limits to the right of a monarch to grant monopoly privileges. Section 6 of the Statute 
of Monopolies provided an exception to the limitations on such monarchical privileges. 
This exception was for inventions. Monopoly privileges could be granted for “any manner 
of new manufactures”, provided these were “not contrary to the law or mischievous to the 
State, by raising prices of commodities at home or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient.” 
For some two hundred years patents of invention were granted only for physical artefacts. 
Then, in 1842, a patent was granted for a process for smelting iron, that involved no 
physical artefact. This judicial extension of patentable subject matter from artefacts to 
processes formed the basis for the subsequent extension of patents to computer software 
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  There are a number of articles which purport to assess obviousness/inventiveness using proxy 
variables, such as the number of backward citations or the number of claims. There is no evidence that these 
are reasonable proxies for inventiveness. Dahlin and Behrens (2005) successfully use patent citation similarity 
scores, comparing patents in the set of tennis racquet patents, to identify the most radical inventions; but this 
is an asymmetrical measure and cannot be used in the inverse to identify obvious patents. Their work does 
however indicate that the simple citation measures are inadequate as a measure of inventiveness.  
11
  Using forward citations to identify the “best” patents, and reading the patent specifications to identify 
obviousness.  
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and business methods. This legally developed doctrine, that processes were patentable, was 
subsequently adopted into statutory law, apparently without any policy debate.  
But processes raise far greater boundary problems for patent law than physical artefacts. 
Such difficulties are compounded in patent systems where a patentable invention is defined 
as a manner of manufacture, with reference to the Statute of Monopolies. In Australia the 
High Court determined, in 1959, that a manner of manufacture was effectively any 
“artificially created state of affairs” that had economic value. This is an extremely broad 
definition of what might be patentable. Christie considers that it means there are no subject 
matter limits to patentability in Australia, except those excluding human beings and the 
biological processes for their generation, which were written into the Patents Act 1990 
(Christie, 2000). 
With the development of computers in the mid-twentieth century, there was an active 
policy debate as to whether patents should be extended to this new technology area. In the 
USA the 1966 President’s Commission on the Patent System recommended that 
patentability not be extended to software, and in 1980 copyright protection was formally 
extended to cover computer programs (Samuelson et al., 1994; Smith and Mann, 2004). 
Subsequently the US government lobbied others to provide this form of protection for 
software. Its first success was in Japan, and in 1994 it succeeded in having copyright 
protection for computer programs made compulsory, as part of the TRIPS Treaty. The 
Australian history was similar (except for the influence on other countries). The 1984 IPAC 
review of patents considered the issue of computer programs, and concluded both that there 
was no need for patents to encourage software innovation and that implementing patent 
“protection” for software would raise substantial practical problems (IPAC, 1984). The 
government accepted these recommendations. In 1984 the Copyright Act was amended to 
formally extended copyright protection to computer programs (Bell, 1987).  
Unfortunately the legal view appears to be that, if no limits are specifically written into a 
statute, then there are no limits, even if a government has considered the matter and reached 
a firm policy conclusion. This approach is most starkly illustrated by the 1980 US Supreme 
Court case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty. The government lawyer argued that the passage by 
Congress of two statutes specifically providing intellectual property ‘protection’ for plants 
was a clear indication that Congress considered that the Patent Act 1953 did not apply to 
any form of life. Five Supreme Court judges disagreed, and in a 5-4 decision allowed the 
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patenting of micro-organisms. This decision was highly influential in the 1981 Diamond v 
Diehr case which opened the doors to patenting software. During the subsequent years 
lawyers continually pushed the boundaries of this decision, and in 1998 the US Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that anything under the sun invented by man 
was patentable (Thomas, 1999, Freedman, 2000, Merges, 2003). This decision was 
effectively been adopted into Australian and New Zealand law. Even in Europe, where 
statute law specifically excludes the patenting of computer programs or business schemes 
as such, many patents are being granted for software and business methods, particularly by 
the European Patent Office (EPO) (Bakels and Hugenholtz, 2002).  
Much of the doctrinal analysis and commentary on patents in general and business method 
patents in particular, suggests that there are good reasons to believe that the general 
standards of patent quality have fallen to a very low level. The story of how the “any 
manner of new manufactures” condition evolved into a novelty test against existing 
knowledge, considered only one item at a time, and an inventiveness test which considers 
that the use of a well-known method in a marginally different field is not obvious, is of 
considerable interest to policy analysts. The bottom line is that the Australian Patents Act 
1990 now has three tests to see if an “invention” is inventive enough to be granted a patent. 
These are the novelty test, the inventiveness test, and a third test to see if the invention is 
actually inventive enough to merit the term invention. This last test has been used to deny 
at least one patent to an “invention” that had passed both the novelty and inventiveness 
tests (Brennan and Christie, 1997). 
This story of a series of doctrines developed through case law and gradually adopted into 
statute law without any further economic or policy analysis provides the context for 
understanding patent law as it operates today. It also explains the gulf in the meaning of the 
word obvious in terms of its normal meaning, and its meaning in patent law. There is a 
large commentary on the number of obvious patents being issued. But most of these meet 
the legal definition of “inventive”. This raises serious questions about the state of balance 
in the patent system as it now operates. And, of course, it is the balance between the 
benefits conferred by a patent system and the costs incurred that determines whether a 
patent system is welfare-enhancing or not. 
12 
5. How inventive are currently granted patents? 
Moir (forthcoming) provides an analysis of the inventiveness of 72 recently granted 
Australian business method patents. The study is based on an assessment of the content of 
each patent, particularly the claims. In this manner it is similar to the useful investigation of 
software patents by Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez, 2005. However Campbell-Kelly and 
Valduriez used the low current USPTO inventiveness standard as their test of 
inventiveness. Here a new approach is developed, based on the policy goals of inducing 
additional innovation and ensuring that the net social impact of the patent system is 
welfare-enhancing. The principal test used in assessing the recent patents is whether they 
contribute to knowledge, either in the technical field of software engineering, or in the non-
technical field of business methods.  
While data on the inventiveness of patents does not answer the question of the net social 
outcome of a patent system, it still advances the evidence basis for the debate. If most 
granted patents are inventive, then at least some social benefits can be anticipated. But if 
many granted patents are only marginally inventive, then any presumed benefits from the 
patent system will be much less, and may not offset the costs that patent systems impose. In 
such circumstances the patent system may be welfare-reducing rather than welfare-
enhancing. Investigation of the inventiveness of patents thus provides critical information 
for the design of a balanced and welfare-enhancing patent policy. 
Between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2006 1,331 patent applications were filed in the 
business method classification in Australia.12 By 30 June 2007 94 of these had been 
accepted or granted.13 The resulting universe of 72 recently granted business method cases 
forms the dataset in Moir (forthcoming). Data were also obtained on whether these patents 
had been granted or rejected overseas, as at December 2007.  
No contributions to either technical or non-technical knowledge are found among these 72 
recently granted patents. One patent appears to use existing knowledge in a manner that 
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  The International Patent Classification system changed on 1 January 2006. Previously business method 
patents were allocated to class G06F 17/60. From 2006, business method patents were allocated to class 
G06Q, excluding sub-group G06Q 20/00. In identifying business method patents, all grants with an allocation 
to any of these classes were selected. Subsequently 21 of these patents were excluded as not being genuine 
business method patents. One Patent of Addition was also excluded as its great-grandparent was also in the 
dataset.  
13
  Very few of these applications had been withdrawn. Over 90 per cent remained pending. 
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might be new.14 Three others contribute new ideas,15 but there appears to be no ingenuity 
required in their implementation. It is unclear that the owners of any of these patents would 
be able to demonstrate they were inventive if the onus of proof lay with the applicant.  
While there are severe boundary problems, it is possible to classify the patents into three 
groups, based on the form the “inventiveness” takes. Some simply take a known method or 
process and combine this either with computers or with networks—19 of the patents fall 
into this group. Others make trivial variations to existing processes, or combine known 
processes—41 fall into this group. The last 12 seem to involve the simple specification of a 
‘problem’, then the use of straightforward logic to generate a ‘solution’. This latter set 
includes six betting patents, and a reverse mortgage finance patent.  
Obviousness, analogous use and combinations 
An early patent doctrine was that of analogous use—where the known properties of a 
material make it well-suited for use in a new situation, this was deemed obvious, and thus 
unpatentable. From a policy perspective, this seems an imminently sensible doctrine, as it 
prevents the grant of a legislated monopoly for something that is likely to generate no 
spillover benefits. Unfortunately this doctrine appears to have been over-ridden, at least in 
Australia, by a subsequent doctrine deeming that the combination of two or more elements  
is not obvious unless someone has already done exactly that, or has written down how to do 
exactly that.16 But the obvious is rarely written down (Ullman, 2000).  
The “inventions” involving mere computerisation or combining a known process with a 
network include examples such as computerisation of the standard method of performing 
property valuations, ordering ID cards over a network, checking if someone is home to take 
a delivery, a geared investment loan package, evaluating performance in business units, 
evaluating business risk, and implementing new software systems. Five of six patents 
which have been rejected overseas involve the mere computerisation of known methods. 
On the other, hand six of the 19 computerisation/network patents have already been granted 
patents overseas.  
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  Converting dates to numeric format before calculating future events.  
15
  Using biometrics as well as other information to track goods; stopping unwanted email at the server; 
and linking bar codes directly to website addresses. These ideas may be novel.  
16
  While this is the Australian situation, similar patents are issuing in the USA, where the CAFC has 
changed the rules about demonstrating obviousness such that what appear obvious combinations to the 
ordinary person are deemed not obvious under patent law (Lunney, 2004).  
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Forty-one of the “inventions” either combine well-known methods or make trivial 
variations to well-known methods. In the worst cases, they involve the application of well-
known techniques in narrow new fields, for example benchmarking or audit. Again one 
might expect that such “inventions” would be ruled uninventive on the basis of the 
analogous use doctrine. But, as indicated earlier, courts (and therefore the patent Office) 
seem to give precedence to a later doctrine which effectively allows the grant of a patent for 
any combination of elements which has not been patented before in exactly that form. 
This doctrinal rule leads directly to an unbalanced patent system. Such a strong priority is 
being given to avoiding the risk of rejecting inventive inventions (type I errors) that very 
large numbers of patents are being granted for uninventive inventions (type II errors). The 
grant of invalid patents incurs high costs for the economy, through their impact on business 
and invention. While design of any policy involves trade-offs, there is general agreement 
that a low inventive step incurs high social costs, which are not offset by spillover benefits. 
In discussing this issue, and the design of patent policy, Jensen and Webster suggest that 
there will always be some errors (Jensen and Webster, 2004). Patent applicants have always 
been able to challenge rejection decisions. Recently courts seem to consider that it is not 
reasonable for an applicant to have to do this. Earlier legal judgements paid more attention 
to the social costs incurred through invalid patents. From a distributional perspective, it is 
an innocent party which bears much of the cost in challenging an invalid patent, while it is 
the party seeking a monopoly which bears the cost of challenging a patent office rejection.  
There is a considerable asymmetry in the incentive to litigate a patent between the patent-
holder and alleged infringers. Litigation costs are high, and the benefit of a decision that a 
patent is invalid is spread among many parties, not all of whom pay for the litigation. In 
contrast, where a patent is deemed valid (either through litigation or because no litigation 
takes place), the patent holder receives the full benefit. Because of these asymmetries, the 
likelihood that an invalid patent will be challenged is less than might be warranted from a 
public good perspective. This re-inforces the policy importance of a goal of minimising 
type II errors.  
Existing knowledge problems 
These 72 patent grants raise a number of issues about the rules used to determine 
inventiveness under patent law. Patent law presumes that there is a good, readily available, 
library of material demonstrating the current state of knowledge. But in software and 
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business methods, much existing knowledge is not available in such a form. This practical 
difficulty was one reason that governments were advised not to extend patentability to 
software. The difficulty remains. One option is to exclude such fields from patentability. 
Another simple alternative would be to place the onus on the party seeking the monopoly to 
demonstrate inventiveness.  
Related to this problem is the set of narrow prescriptive rules determining which pieces of 
knowledge can be used to determine either novelty or inventiveness. If it is an objective of 
patent policy to generate knowledge about new ways of doing things, then the body of 
existing knowledge used to test inventiveness or novelty should not be artificially 
narrowed. To narrow the body of existing knowledge is to tilt the playing field in favour of 
the applicant, and against the public interest. Statute law embodies doctrines developed 
through case law that limit the existing knowledge against which an alleged “invention” is 
measured. The most surreal of these rules is that previously patented inventions are not 
automatically considered part of the body of knowledge for the inventiveness test.  
Courts now seem to be defining the relevant field of technology in a very narrow way. In 
respect of the US patent system, Bagley (2001) has demonstrated how technology fields are 
being so narrowly construed that most relevant prior knowledge is ruled inadmissible in the 
obviousness test. In a key Australian case, Welcome Real Time, the way in which the 
relevant field was construed, not as smartcard technology, but as loyalty programs, was 
critical to the decision of validity. Given the important policy goal that the social benefit of 
a patent system should exceed its cost (IPCRC, 2000), this judicial approach tends to 
unbalance the system. Like the doctrine that combinations should not be deemed obvious 
unless someone has said they are, this approach leans strongly in the direction of ensuring 
that patents are granted, regardless of whether there is a benefit to society. In part this is 
possible because the patent statute specifies no overall objectives.  
Level of generality 
Another major point emerging from the analysis is that some patents are written at such a 
high level of generality that there appears to be no difference between the idea and its 
implementation. Such cases, like the Signature patent at the heart of the State Street Bank 
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case, effectively provide a monopoly on the idea.17 The patents in the dataset considered 
here are mostly software applications, and are written in terms of such broad concepts as 
“calculating modules”, “control means”, “display means”, “receiving device”, “capture 
apparatus” and so on. In no cases are there any technical specifications, even where specific 
devices are used. This means that the patent specifications disclose little other than the 
general idea of the “invention”. The lack of knowledge disclosure is not, however, a 
problem for this set of patents, as they contribute no new knowledge.  
But the higher level of abstraction, the broader the scope of the claims. In a number of the 
cases examined it is clear that the “invention” has been developed in a specific environment 
(e.g. residential property valuation, processing insurance claims) but the scope claimed in 
the patent is for a much wider field (asset valuation, workflow prediction). While such 
claims are yet to be tested in court, they do pose risks for other businesses. And the broader 
the claim, the greater the risk, if the patent is held to be valid.  
“Manner of manufacture” 
Another issue emerging from this study is that the requirement for a specified output is so 
general as to be meaningless. Acceptable outputs such as “the repayment amount 
determined for the loan”, or “generating a payment to each punter” mean that the manner of 
manufacture test has become totally ineffective in limiting the reach of the patent system. 
The requirement for a science or technology basis has been removed from the Australian 
patent system. The Australian Law Reform Commission has recommended review of this 
antiquated “manner of manufacture” concept (ALRC, 2004). This study indicates that such 
a review is not only urgent, but should also address the issue of whether a specific science 
and technology basis should be written into the definition of an invention in patent law.  
6. Policy Implications 
While in other fields there has been an increasing emphasis on the need for an evidence 
base to policy,18 no such concerns have yet led to the development of appropriate databases 
from which to assess the real costs and benefits of patent systems.  
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  In that case, a monopoly on computerised implementation of US Internal Revenue Service guidelines 
for pooled mutual funds in joint portfolios (Krause, 2000).  
18
  The Cochrane Collaboration—to consolidate empirical evidence as a basis for determining the best 
approach to treating diseases—has been influential in the movement towards a demand for a stronger 
evidence basis for public policy beyond the health field. Information on the Cochrane Collaboration is 
available at http://cochrane.org (last access 28 January 2008). 
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There have been previous calls for the development of data on which patent policy 
decisions could be based. In Australia the IPAC review recommended that data on the use 
of patents be provided on each occasion when a patent was renewed (IPAC, 1984). This 
recommendation has never been implemented. More recently Bakels and Hugenholtz have 
called for the establishment of a European Patent Observatory (Bakels and Hugenholtz, 
2002: 44). Again no action has been taken. In the specific field of the extension of patents 
to software and business methods, there have been several efforts to develop a knowledge 
base for use in policy determination in the USA. These have been stopped.19  
Developing an evidence base 
So the first need is for the establishment of effective data to measure the economic costs 
and benefits of patent systems. There are two obvious avenues for this. The first is to ensure 
that patent databases are re-oriented to meet public policy needs.20 This means that patent 
data need to be accessible for economic analysis.21 Further, when patents are renewed 
patentees should be required to provide information on how the patent is being used. This 
would not be an onerous task for patentees—a simple one-page pre-coded set of options 
could be provided. These data on how patents are being used would be invaluable 
information for assessing both the costs and the benefits of patent policy. They would 
provide a basis for establishing whether there are significant differences between different 
categories of patents in their costs and benefits.  
The second avenue for collecting useful data on patents are the National Innovation 
Surveys that are now being undertaken in many countries, including Australia. Given the 
clear policy orientation of these surveys, it is surprising how little information they collect 
about patent use.22 Mairesse and Mohnen (2003) note that the second (European) 
                                                 
19
  In regard to data on the extension of patenting to software and business methods Kahin (2003) notes 
that "The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy commissioned a study on software patent 
quality and business effect by the Science and Technology Policy Institute at RAND in early 1998. However, 
it was suspended at the request of a U.S. multinational company concerned that the study would undercut 
efforts to secure greater international acceptance of software patents. The penultimate Senate draft of the 
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 mandated a General Accounting Office study of business method 
patents, but this was removed at the behest of the patent bar. Despite calls by the 1999 National Research 
Council report, Digital Dilemma, for research on the effects of software patents, no studies have been 
commissioned, nor has the National Science Foundation supported any empirical research on the subject." 
20
  At present they are designed to meet the needs of patent attorneys and patent applicants. 
21
  This requires the ability to analyse patent data on the basis of multiple fields, with these being 
determined by the analyst. It also means that improved cross-classifications to industry must be developed, so 
that data can readily be matched to other economic information on the behaviour of firms.  
22
  Or perhaps it is not. Perhaps innovation analysts are well aware that patents are of only very limited 
use in encouraging innovation, and hence do not waste space asking about them.  
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Community Innovation Survey (CIS2) asked no questions about mechanisms to protect 
innovation. The third survey (CIS3) asked whether patents and other formal (legal) or 
strategic (market) mechanisms were used, but did not ask about the relative importance or 
effectiveness attached to them.23 These surveys are regularly undertaken, and are targeted at 
innovative firms—the exact target group for patent policy—so they provide an ideal 
opportunity for finding out a great deal more about the operations of patent systems. They 
could be used to collect data both on the forms in which patents are used by firms that own 
them, and on the impact of patents owned by other firms on the behaviour of innovating 
firms. These are currently major gaps in knowledge about the impact of patent systems. 
Policy changes 
Changes to patent policy should not wait until such databases are established and analysed. 
There is sufficient evidence already on the table to show that, for most industries, patents 
are ineffective policy. They have no effect in inducing additional innovation. The obvious 
solution is to restrict the fields for which patents are granted. This would create boundary 
problems, but these are implicit in any market regulation, and simply have to be dealt with. 
Previous boundary problems were eroded by the continuous extensions in software 
patenting, argued in court between private parties. The challenge and costs of boundary 
problems are not a reason for removing boundaries, though they might be a reason for 
removing market regulation. If there is to be market intervention, then it should be only 
where the benefits clearly exceed the costs. For patents, this means that patents should only 
be granted where innovations have a very high component of codified knowledge, and 
where development costs are high. 
The simplest way to implement this boundary would be to establish which technologies can 
be patented and which cannot. This, however, would breach Article 27 of TRIPS, and any 
country contemplating this welfare-enhancing change to patent policy would face very high 
costs. An alternative would be to add codification proportions and development cost 
minima as new threshold tests for patentability. While far more complex and thus riskier 
(who knows what the courts would read into such limitations), this would be a TRIPS-
compliant approach to limiting the scope of patents to those areas of innovation where 
patent policy is likely to enhance rather than reduce welfare.  
                                                 
23
  The fact that much higher percentages of firms reported market mechanisms than patents does provide 
some indication of relative importance. See Eurostat, 2004: 290-298 for a copy of the CIS3 questionnaire.  
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Australia has not resiled from taking a leading international educational role where it 
considers policy approaches to be misguided and welfare-reducing. The pre-eminent 
example is with regard to the welfare losses consequent on agricultural protection, where 
ABARE prepared a series of materials directed at influencing overseas policy thinking. 
This educational investment is important in levelling the policy playing field where major 
vested interests are active lobbyists. There is a direct parallel with the “intellectual 
property” field. Substantial empirical evidence is available, and more could readily be 
collected. These data demonstrate that “strong” patent systems are likely to be welfare-
reducing, even in large technology-exporting nations. Despite this evidence, the 
international policy community continues to place great weight on unsubstantiated 
assertions, such as a strong and direct relationship between patent protection and 
innovativeness. Academic authorities have expressed surprise at the continuing strength of 
the pro-patent lobby in the face of the evidence that patents are generally ineffective 
(Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998, Scherer, 2006). Clearly a strong effort is needed to introduce 
an evidence basis into international patent policy discussions.  
Subject matter exclusions 
When TRIPS was agreed, in 1994, it was accepted that the most appropriate form of 
“protection” for software was copyright. Article 10 of the TRIPS Treaty requires that 
copyright “protection” be provided for computer software. It was commonly understood 
that computer software was not patentable, and the question of the patenting of business 
methods had not even been raised. It is therefore possible to exclude these fields from 
patentability without breaching the terms of the TRIPS Treaty.  
With one exception, the 72 patents reviewed are all for computer programs.24 Computer 
programs are, of course protected against copying by the Copyright Act 1968, amended in 
1984 to include software programs. These “inventions” are therefore double-dipping in 
terms of “protection” against imitation.25 Providing patent protection for software not only 
protects against copying, but it also prohibits independent creation. Where the “invention” 
is only trivially different from existing systems, such independent invention is highly 
likely. This increases the social cost of the monopoly grant.  
                                                 
24
  Though four also claim a monopoly over the manual version. 
25
  Indeed with modern encryption methods, there could be three layers of “protection”.  
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The policy question of the patentability of software is still an active issue, at least in 
Europe. The recent extension of patentable subject matter to business methods, makes 
serious policy attention to this question urgent. If software were excluded from 
patentability, the only “invention” from the dataset in Moir (forthcoming) that would have 
been granted a patent is the system for teaching children about the meaning of money by 
having them work for their pocket money. 
In Australia a move to restrict patentable subject matter to inventions based on science and 
technology could usefully be combined with a review of the term “manner of manufacture”. 
Such a review was strongly recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(2004). The review should be undertaken from an economic perspective, and should have 
as an over-arching goal the return of balance to the patent bargain. It should be undertaken 
by persons who are independent of the patent system,26 and should include economists, 
industry policy analysts and representatives of the science and engineering communities, as 
well as consumer representatives.  
Much of the discussion about the extension of patenting to business methods has been 
couched in terms of the issue being low inventiveness standards rather than a problem with 
subject matter extensions. Indeed Kahin asks whether it is useful to see business method 
patents as an issue in patent policy rather than patent administration (Kahin, 2003b). 
Certainly if software were excluded from patentability, or if a genuine knowledge 
contribution in a field of technology or science were required, almost none of these patents 
would have been granted. But it is equally true that if there was a genuine inventive step 
threshold, requiring at least a modest contribution to new knowledge, and comparing this to 
all previously existing knowledge, almost none of these patents would have been granted. 
So this study suggests that both subject matter extensions and other critical design features 
of patent law and administration are important issues in innovation policy. 
A genuine inventive step 
This study has noted the wide body of expert opinion in the USA that suggests the standard 
of inventiveness required in US patent law is extremely low.  Bakels and Hugenholtz 
(2002) argue cogently that the current very low inventiveness standard in Europe is based 
on standards introduced through case law and legal doctrine. Moir (forthcoming) shows 
                                                 
26
  Members of the patent community would, of course, be free to present their views through evidence 
and submissions. 
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that the inventiveness standard in Australia is equally miniscule. Moir also shows that the 
low standard has been developed through a series of legal doctrines, based on individual 
cases. Together these doctrines so constrain the meaning of inventiveness in patent law, 
that it is virtually non-existent.  
Because these low standards have developed through case law, they can only be reversed 
by amending the relevant statutes. Legislative change is required. This view is echoed by 
Bakels and Hugenholtz (2002: 37). In this they part company from many other 
commentators who recommend a range of administrative changes within patent offices. But 
it is clear that it is legal doctrine that is increasingly sloping the patent playing field in the 
interests of patent applicants, in a manner that significantly reduces economic welfare. 
Changing patent office practices will not change the attitude of judges, who are entirely 
independent. It will simply result in judges telling patent offices to adopt different 
procedures. The only available mechanism for raising the inventiveness standard is 
legislative change. In Australia there have been two very minor changes to statute law to 
attempt to raise the inventiveness threshold (1990, 2001), but these moves fall far short of 
what is needed. As long a most existing knowledge is ruled out of court for the purposes of 
assessing the novelty or inventiveness of a patent application, the standard for the grant of 
patents will be low, and there will be many patents granted that provide no spillover 
benefits to offset the costs they create.  
Using market regulation disciplines to enhance welfare 
Beyond these specific changes to legal doctrines, patent law could usefully draw on the 
general approaches used for ensuring that market regulations are welfare-enhancing. These 
approaches would be of great assistance in ensuring that patents were only granted for 
inventions that were likely to contribute spillover benefits, thus offsetting the social costs 
created by the patent system.  
Onus of proof 
The legislative presumptions of novelty and inventiveness mean that it is the government 
which has to show that a patent application is uninventive, rather than the applicant 
showing that it is inventive. Attorneys actively use of this rule in arguing for grant of a 
patent. There is no logical or evidence-based reason for this reversal of proof within the 
patent system. The normal regulatory rule is that the onus lies with the party seeking 
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intervention in the market to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that such intervention would 
be welfare-enhancing. If this normal rule were adopted, it is likely that most of the 
uninventive “inventions” reviewed in this study would not have been granted a patent. 
Others have also suggested that the onus of proof should be made consistent with normal 
regulatory norms. Such a policy change would be TRIPS-compliant.27 
Standard of proof 
The norm in most cases of regulatory intervention is that the benefit of regulatory 
intervention must be significantly greater than the harm. Due to the dominance of the legal 
approach in patent policy discussions such an option was dismissed by the IPCRC as being 
inappropriate for a civil matter (IPCRC, 2000). But patent policy is a tool of economic 
policy. The appropriate standard for regulatory intervention in the market is that the benefit 
be significantly greater than the harm. The appropriate decision-making standard in patent 
policy is therefore beyond reasonable doubt. This decision-making rule should be adopted 
for all aspects of patent policy and should be clearly written into the statute.  
Patent policy goals 
Issues about the onus of proof and the standard of proof are closely related to the policy 
goal that, overall, patent policy should be welfare-enhancing. That is, the social benefits 
arising from the policy should be greater than the social costs incurred. This question of 
balance has been a feature of patent policy since the exception to the limitation on 
monarchical monopoly privileges was first created in 1624. But it is not written into the 
statute. Indeed the purpose of patent policy is not written into the statute. It is time it was. 
This would give judges the guidance they clearly need in interpreting the statute in a 
manner that is welfare-enhancing rather than welfare-reducing. The patent statute should 
include a statement that the goal of patent policy is to increase investment in technological 
invention and innovation, in such a way that the overall benefit to society is greater than the 
overall cost. This could be complemented by a statutory requirement to administer the 
statute in a manner to minimise type II errors (granting invalid patents).  
                                                 
27
  Extraordinarily, the TRIPS Treaty includes an Article requiring that the normal judicial burden of 
proof be reversed in the case of process patents. Article 34 sets out circumstances where a product shall be 
deemed to have been produced using a patented process unless the alleged infringer (the accused) proves 
otherwise (http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm (accessed 30 April 2008)). However 
Article 34 applies only to litigation about infringement of a granted patent. Nothing in the TRIPS Treaty 
prevents an administrative requirement that applicants for patents be required to demonstrate that their 
inventions meet the statutory requirements of novelty, utility and inventiveness.  
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